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1. Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. Econ. 
Persp. 29, 29 (1991).
2. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 
873 (1990).
3. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 341, 382-83 & n.245 (2010) (recounting how the 
literature has failed to address the e@ects of patent scope on commercialization).
Abstract: A recurring issue in intellectual property theory is how the scope of patent rights 
affects invention and commercialization. Traditionally, there has been a dichotomous debate: 
one view stemming from Ed Kitch, promoting broad “prospect”-style patents in the hands 
of a single inventor, and another view from Robert Merges and Richard Nelson, advocating 
relatively narrow scope to encourage competition in innovation. More recently, a variety of 
scholars have set forth more nuanced positions. My thesis here is that the variance in these 
views can be traced to differing empirical attitudes about how well the market functions 
relative to a patent system in promoting invention, commercialization, and coordination 
among market actors in the R&D process. By investigating these empirical differences, 
scholars can more rigorously address a number of important issues not fully examined by the 
literature, such as the cumulative nature of technology commercialization (not just invention), 
the tailoring of patent scope by industry, collaborative innovation, and the decoupling of 
patent rights to separately address invention and commercialization incentives.
A long-standing question in IP scholarship is how the patent system should optimally 
balance the rights of an initial, pioneering inventor and follow-on inventors who improve 
upon the initial invention. Surprisingly, this critical issue was not fully recognized until 
two seminal articles emerged—one by Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of 
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law,1 and the other by Robert Merges and 
Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope.2 The insights of these works, 
particularly as to how patent scope affects cumulative innovation, have been extensively 
recounted. However, the literature has failed to address an important shortcoming in these 
articles: their failure to account for another follow-on activity, the commercialization of the 
initial invention into a product or method suitable for use by consumers.3 In this brief essay, I 
focus on Merges and Nelson’s article to illustrate my point, as well as to make a broader claim 
that scholarly views about patent scope boil to down to empirical assumptions about how 
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4. Edmund W. Kitch, "e Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265 (1977).
5. See Kitch, supra note 4, at 276-80.
6. See id. at 276-278.
7. See id. at 269; see also Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, "e Product Market and the Market for “Ideas”: 
Commercialization Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs, 32 Res. Pol’y 333, 348 (2003) (“[IP protection] 
allows for cooperation between start-ups and incumbents who might otherwise view innovation purely as a 
competitive threat.”). Recent empirical research lends support to Kitch’s thesis. For example, a cross-industry 
empirical study found that Qrms lacking specialized complementary assets were, in the presence of strong patent 
protection, more likely to license their innovations than compete in the market—arguably, a relatively eVcient 
outcome. See Asish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, and Firms’ Incentives 
for Technology Licensing, 52 Mgmt. Sci. 293 (2006).
8. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 2, at 871-78.
9. See id. at 872-73.
10. See Kitch, supra note 4, at 265-66 (citing Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 Rev. Econ. & 
Stat. 348 (1968) (analogizing the development of technological information to Qsheries, public roads, and other 
common resources)).
11. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 2, at 873.
12. See id. at 874.
well the market functions to drive invention and commercialization, as well as to coordinate 
R&D among disparate market actors.
More than a decade before Merges and Nelson’s article, Ed Kitch tackled commercialization 
concerns in his landmark article, On the Nature and Function of the Patent System.4 Kitch 
argued that by granting broad patent rights early in the inventive process, a single patent 
holder could effectively coordinate post-invention development and commercialization 
efforts undertaken by others.5 This approach reduces potential costs of duplication in the 
R & D process, and—importantly, for the argument here—prevents third parties’ use of 
unpatentable information generated during the development and commercialization process.6 
Kitch argued that his “prospect theory”—which analogized the granting of patents to the 
allocation of mining rights—would optimally insure against commercialization risk and 
costs, promoting the investment needed to make and sell products in the marketplace.7 
0HUJHV DQG1HOVRQ WDNH LVVXHZLWK.LWFK·V SUHIHUHQFH IRU D VLQJOH ÀUP WR FRQWURO WKH
innovation process surrounding a given prospect, or technological opportunity, via broad 
patent rights.8 First, relying on early forms of behavioral economics, they argue that a single ÀUP LVRIWHQ VOXJJLVK DQGZLOOQRWFDSLWDOL]HRQHYHU\SURÀWDEOHRSSRUWXQLW\ WRGHYHORSD
technological prospect.9,QWKLVUHJDUGWKH\FRQWHQGWKDWWKHDQDORJ\RIPLQLQJRUÀVKLQJULJKWV
is inapt,10 because there is generally no single, known prospect that inventors seek out—rather, 
each inventor will view a technological problem differently, arriving at various solutions, which 
will promote more diverse kinds of innovation.11 Second, while the prospect patent holder could 
theoretically bring many minds to bear on any given technological problem, steep transaction 
costs—particularly in coordinating the licensing of patent rights among many actors—will 
generally diminish the holder’s ability to do so.12 Because of these reasons—which Merges 
and Nelson back up with a host of short case studies—Kitch’s prospect-style patents will 
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often grant too broad protection for optimal technological development. As such, Merges and 
Nelson contend that a theory of cabined patent scope is more suitable.
Merges and Nelson’s critique of Kitch is incisive and has been cited widely in later 
scholarship.13 But Merges and Nelson obscure an important distinction in Kitch’s work—that 
between reducing duplicated development costs through coordination and promoting optimal 
commercialization of a given invention.140HUJHVDQG1HOVRQHVVHQWLDOO\IRFXVRQWKHÀUVW
aspect of prospect theory, mostly ignoring Kitch’s concerns about commercialization.15 So 
while Merges and Nelson may have convincingly cast doubt on the value of broad patents in 
spurring follow-on development and invention, they said nearly nothing about the effects of 
such patents on commercialization. Following upon Merges and Nelson, later scholars have 
generally taken the same tack, treating prospect theory as solely concerning the improvement 
of initial invention, rather than commercialization.16 Indeed, at the symposium associated 
with this volume, Merges admitted that his and Nelson’s article perhaps unfairly characterized 
prospect theory in this manner.17
This distinction between follow-on invention and post-invention commercialization is not MXVWVHPDQWLF6SHFLÀFDOO\IROORZRQLQYHQWLRQLVWHFKQRORJLFDOLQQDWXUHDQG³LIVXIÀFLHQWO\
innovative—is protectable by additional patent rights. Commercialization efforts, however, 
often involve non-technological activities, including market research to assess which product 
features are most desirable as well as to determine optimal pricing and sales techniques, DQG EXLOG D FRQVXPHUPDUNHW E\ JHQHUDWLQJ VXIÀFLHQW SURGXFW GHPDQG18 These activities 
are generally not protectable by intellectual property and, thus, are subject to free riding.19 
By providing strong patent rights, however, as Kitch recognized, “the patent owner has an 
incentive to make investments to maximize the value of the patent without fear that the fruits 
of the investment will produce unpatentable information appropriable by competitors.”20 
Thus, by focusing on follow-on technological—instead of commercialization—efforts, 
Merges and Nelson unfairly intensify the thrust of their counter-attack.
13. See, e.g., John F. Du@y, Rethinking the Prospect "eory of Patents, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 439, 441-42 (2004); Tim 
Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 Va. L. Rev. 123, 133 (2006).
14. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 2, at 878-79. 
15. Similarly, Scotchmer’s model of “cumulative innovation” implicitly assumes that the invention process always 
produces a commercial “good” that may be immediately distributed, thereby abstracting away from the critical 
step of post-invention development and commercialization. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation And 
Incentives 37-39, 243-44 (2004).
16. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons: Imperfect Patent Protection and the Network 
Model of Innovation, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 987, 1007 (2000); Mark A. Lemley, "e Economics of Improvement in 
Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 1047 (1997).
17. See Audio recording: Patent Scope Revisited: Merges & Nelson’s “On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope,” 20 Years A~er, held by the Indiana University-Bloomington Maurer School of Law (Sept. 23-24, 2010) 
(on Qle with the Maurer School of Law).
18. See Sichelman, supra note 3, at 352, 360.
19. See id.
20. Kitch, supra note 4, at 276.
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But I cannot entirely fault Merges and Nelson for taking such an approach. Like most IP 
scholars, they are “commercialization optimists” in the sense that they believe the market will 
optimally provide for the commercialization of inventions absent patent protection.21 In other 
words, inventions are commercial products “out of the box,” and any further work necessary to 
dress up the product for sales and distribution will be taken care of by unprotected markets.22 
On this view, the only reason we afford any sort of patent protection after the invention is FRPSOHWHGLVWRVXIÀFLHQWO\UHFRPSHQVHWKHLQYHQWRUIRUKLVHIIRUWVDQGLQYHVWPHQWXQGHUWDNLQJ
priorWRÀOLQJIRUDSDWHQW23 If the government, for instance, could somehow determine the 
optimal payment ex ante to induce invention, then patents would be unnecessary. Instead, 
after appropriate payment to the inventor, an invention otherwise suitable for patenting 
would be dumped into the public domain, after which any third party could come along and 
commercialize the invention by transforming it into a consumable product or method.24 
More generally, Merges and Nelson differ from Kitch in their underlying assumptions 
about how well the market incentivizes certain innovative activity. Although Merges 
and Nelson are commercialization optimists, they are invention market pessimists in the VHQVHWKDWWKH\EHOLHYHSDWHQWVDUHRIWHQQHFHVVDU\WRDIIRUGLQYHQWLRQLQWKHÀUVWLQVWDQFHSDUWLFXODUO\IRUSLRQHHULQJLQYHQWLRQV$QGÀQDOO\WKH\DUHSDWHQW´ FRRUGLQDWLRQµSHVVLPLVWV
because they believe patents will tend to hinder coordination in R&D among multiple market 
actors.25 Kitch, on the other hand, is exactly the opposite—a commercialization pessimist, 
invention optimist, and coordination optimist. Ultimately, Merges and Nelson seem to differ 
from Kitch not so much in their utilitarian theoretical lens on the patent system, but rather 
on their views of how the underlying empirical mechanics of the patent system function in 
an embedded market. 
Traditionally, Kitch’s and Merges and Nelson’s work has created a long-standing 
dichotomy between a strong, property rights-oriented and a weaker, governance-centered 
vision of patent law.26 But, more recently, several scholars have tread different paths. Perhaps WKHÀUVWGLYHUJHQFHZDV6FRWW.LHII·VLQVLJKWIXOZRUNProperty Rights and Property Rules for 
Commercializing Inventions.27 Drawing upon Kitch’s espousal of broad patent rights, Kieff 
21. See Sichelman, supra note 3, at 358-59; see also Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justi#cations for 
Intellectual Property, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 129, 129-30 & n.2 (2004); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and 
Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 805, 807 (1988).
22. See Sichelman, supra note 3, at 358-59.
23. See Lemley, supra note 21, at 129-31.
24. Cf. Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & Econ. 525, 
529 (2001) (assuming that the result of “research” is an “innovation,” such that if the “innovation” were made 
freely “available to competitors” that it would “sell at marginal cost”).
25. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 2, at 908-909.
26. See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 
1742, 1745-46 (2007) (contrasting “exclusion” with “governance” policy strategies in intellectual property law).
27. F. Scott Kie@, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 697, 707-
08 (2001).
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argues that strong, real property-like protection “is necessary to facilitate investment in the 
complex, costly, and risky commercialization activities required to turn nascent inventions 
into new goods and services.”28 Yet, unlike Kitch, Kieff is less sanguine about patents as 
tools for reducing duplicated development costs (so-called “rent dissipation”) via control 
of a technological prospect by a single actor; instead, he promotes the ability of patents to 
coordinate activities across multiple, complementary actors during the commercialization 
process.29 Moreover, Kieff is even less concerned than Kitch about the role of patents in 
spurring invention.30
Michael Abramowicz and John Duffy are—like Kitch and Kieff—commercialization 
market pessimists, particularly regarding the ability of the market to promote market 
experimentation for innovative products.31 Yet, Abramowicz and Duffy are not so quick 
as Kitch and Kieff to dismiss invention concerns.32 Similarly, Chris Cotropia analyzes how WKH WLPLQJRISDWHQWÀOLQJDIIHFWVFRPPHUFLDOL]DWLRQ LQFHQWLYHV\HWKHGRHVQRWGRZQSOD\
invention incentives, nor does he promote patents as coordinating tools.33 In my own 
work, I have been quite sympathetic to the general approach of these “ex post” theories but 
adopt a slightly different stance. Like Kieff, I do not view patent law as particularly important 
to spurring inventive activity, but like Cotropia, I think large transaction costs are likely 
to prevent patents from being terribly effective in reducing duplicated development 
costs.34
Other scholars use Merges and Nelson as their starting point, but stretch to different 
extremes. James Bessen and Michael Meurer, in their popular book, Patent Failure, are 
market optimists for invention and commercialization—at least in the sense that they contend 
patents (outside of biotech and pharma) result in net social losses—and are skeptical that 
28. Id. at 703; see also Atul Nerkar & Scott Shane, Determinants of Invention Commercialization: An Empirical 
Examination of Academically Sourced Inventions, 28 Strat. Mgmt. J. 1155, 1157 (2007) (“Broader scope protection 
increases the likelihood that any trial-and-error e@orts that are necessary to develop new products and services 
will result in something for which returns can be appropriated because broader patent scope allows the Qrm 
exploiting the invention to explore product and service applications over a wider range of technical areas.”); id. 
at 1162 (Qnding that inventions covered by patents with broader scope were more likely to be commercialized); 
Scott Shane, Technological Opportunities and New Firm Creation, 47 Mgmt. Sci. 205, 215 (2001) (Qnding in an 
empirical study of MIT patents that ones with broader “scope,” deQned as the number of international classes 
assigned to the patent, were “more likely to be commercialized through the creation of new Qrms”).
29. See F. Scott Kie@, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to 
Anticompetitive E$ects and Downstream Access, 56 Emory L.J. 327, 405-06 (2006).
30. See id. at 328.
31. See Michael Abramowicz & John Du@y, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
337 (2008).
32. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John Du@y, "e Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 Yale L.J. (2011) 
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1694883.
33. See Christopher A. Cotropia, "e Folly of Early Filing In Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (2009).
34. See Sichelman, supra note 3.
SDWHQWVFDQHIÀFLHQWO\FRRUGLQDWH5	'35 Oskar Liivak takes a similar tack and would go so 
far as to limit patent infringement to instances where the accused infringer directly copied 
from the patent holder’s technology.36
These views divide scholars into various camps, depending on their particular levels 
of optimism among three axes: invention market optimism, commercialization market 
optimism, and patent coordination optimism (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Typologies of Patent Scope Theorists
More generally, my thesis here is that scholars’ differing empirical views about how well 
the market operates to promote invention and commercialization—along with how well 
patents can lead to the coordination of R & D activity—sculpts their theoretical positions 
about the proper role of patent scope and, indeed, the patent system as a whole. The traditional 
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35. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, And Lawyers Put 
Innovators At Risk (2008).
36. Oscar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 1643 (2010).
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debate among these scholars has been between commercialization market optimists/
coordination pessimists like Merges and Nelson, who advocate relatively narrow patent scope, 
and commercialization pessimists/coordination optimists, like Kitch, who advocate relatively 
broad patent scope.
But a more complex empirical picture leads to much richer—and, indeed, even less 
tractable—sets of questions for the patent scope debate. For instance, the whole set of 
literature on cumulative invention37³DQGWKHGLIÀFXOWLHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKRSWLPDOO\GLYLGLQJ
rents between initial and follow-on inventors—can be fruitfully applied to issues in optimizing 
commercialization of an invention (or, a technological prospect, in Kitch’s terms). Indeed, 
Meurer has recently applied Scotchmer’s theory of cumulative invention to formulate a 
commercialization decision-making model.38
Another area worthy of more study is how differences in industry structure and dynamic 
evolution should affect patent scope. Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have made an admirable 
initial attempt to tackle this thorny issue,39 but several particulars are in need of further 
exploration, especially from an empirical standpoint. First, how do industries differ in the 
ability of the market to promote invention and commercialization? Second, how do they 
differ in the use of patents to coordinate R&D? Third, how do these results change as 
industries mature? Some empirical work in the industrial organization literature has explored 
answers to these questions, but much remains to be done. My sense is that further study will 
help scholars come to more agreement on which perspective outlined above best applies to 
particular industries, and companies and individuals within industries.
Next, each side of the Kitch-Merges/Nelson dichotomy arguably rests on unrealistic 
assumptions about the ideal structure of industrial innovation. Kitch’s work, especially 
the over-stylized accounts of it prevalent in the literature, promotes lodging the innovative 
process in a monopolist patentee that can coordinate every facet of R&D activity for a 
particular technological prospect.40 Merges and Nelson counter Kitch by arguing in favor 
of competitive rivalry in innovation.41 Yet, the optimal approach to innovation may, in many 
situations, lie somewhere in a collaborative middle—whereby multiple parties, each with 
patents or some other form of proprietary know-how, cooperate in achieving an innovative 
37. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, A%er-Arising Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. 
Am. L. 151 (2005); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: "e Role of 
Patents and Antitrust, 16 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 813 (2001); Scotchmer, supra note 1.
38. See Michael J. Meurer, Patent Notice and Cumulative Innovation (Working Paper, May 15, 2008), available 
at http://innovationforum.gmu.edu/2008/papers/patent_notice.pdf (adapting Scotchmer’s approach so that the 
follow-on innovator is a commercializer that is subject to the original innovator’s patent). However, Meurer uses 
this adapted model to analyze the incentives of commercializers to search for potentially relevant patents—not 
to determine the e@ects of patent scope on commercialization. See id.
39. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis And How The Courts Can Solve It (2009); Dan 
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575 (2003).
40. See Kitch, supra note 4, at 276-80; Lemley, supra note 21, at 138-39.
  
      	 
              
UHVXOW)RUH[DPSOH1HWÁL[³WKHRQOLQHSURYLGHURIPRYLHV³UHFHQWO\VWDJHGDPLOOLRQ
contest to solicit algorithms to predict how a user would rate a movie after watching it 
in order to provide more accurate personalized movie recommendations.42 Thousands of WHDPV HQWHUHG WKH FRQWHVW DQG WKH IHZ WKDW ÀQDOO\ HPHUJHG DV WKH OHDGHUV LQFOXGLQJ WKH
winning team, were mergers among many of the original teams.43 The success of these sorts RIFROODERUDWLYHVWUDWHJLHVFRXOGUHÁHFWLQWHUPHGLDWHOHYHOVRI5	'FRRUGLQDWLRQGHIHFWVLQ
the market, counseling in favor of patent scope that lies somewhere between the relatively 
broad scope recommended by Kitch and the relatively narrow scope promoted by Merges 
and Nelson.
Last, if the patent system aims to govern a variety of separate innovative activities, WKHQ LQVWHDGRI WU\LQJ WRÀQHWXQH WKH VFRSHRIRQH W\SHRI ULJKW DQRWKHURSWLRQ³ZKLFK
I have suggested elsewhere—is to split the patent system in half.44 “Invention” patents 
would incentivize inventive activity, while “commercialization” patents would foster the 
commercialization of invention.45 My proposal draws from the work of several scholars, 
including Abramowicz, Duffy, and William Kingston,46 and while well-grounded conceptually, 
certainly needs further empirical study to test its soundness. 
In sum, Kitch, Scotchmer, and Merges and Nelson took critical steps in promoting our 
understanding of the role of patent law, particularly patent scope, in cumulative invention 
and commercialization. However, in important respects, later scholars have developed more QXDQFHG WKHRUHWLFDODSSURDFKHV7KHYDULHW\RIYLHZVRQ WKH WRSLF LQP\RSLQLRQ UHÁHFW
differing underlying assumptions about how well the market functions to promote invention, 
commercialization, and the coordination of R & D among market actors. When these root 
differences are exposed, several important questions come to the fore, such as the cumulative 
nature of technology commercialization (not just invention), the tailoring of patent scope by 
industry, collaborative innovation, and the decoupling of patent rights. With further study of 
these and related issues, I believe enough consensus will emerge among scholars that we can 
begin to agree on how to best tailor patent scope.
41. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 2, at 908-09.
42. See Steve Lohr, A $1 Million Research Bargain for Net(ix, and Maybe a Model for Others, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/technology/internet/22netix.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.
43. See id.
44. See Sichelman, supra note 3.
45. See id.
46. William Kingston, "e “"esis” Chapters, in Direct Protection Of Innovation (William Kingston ed. 
1987); see also William Kingston, Beyond Intellectual Property (2010); Michael Abramowicz, "e 
Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1065, 1066 (2007); Abramowicz & Du@y, supra 
note 31.
